February 8, 2016–Greetings to all who observe the Lunar New Year! For me personally, the shock of the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War, back in 1968, put the Lunar New Year on the calendar, while many years of living in New York, with very active celebrations downtown, made it memorable. But the indelible element is Tet. Now, the thing about the Tet Offensive which made it so extraordinary is that fighting suddenly broke out all across South Vietnam. Yet when people talk about “Tet” it’s mostly three pieces of the action they mean–the fighting in Saigon (especially at the American embassy), the siege of Hue, or the battle of Khe Sanh. I admit I’ve written about all three. But there’s more to the story. In my book Vietnam: Unwinnable War I tried to expand the horizon, particularly on actions in the Mekong Delta. I’ve done pieces elsewhere, too, including one on “Tet in II Corps” that appeared in The VVA Veteran back in 2009. I was pleased the other day when a veteran of the events portrayed in that article approached me to correct some of what it said. With the Lunar New Year coming right up, this seems an ideal moment to mark it with a non-Saigon story. So, herewith, to Qui Nhon at Tet.


Qui Nhon is a city on the central Vietnamese coast. In the American war it was important as the rear base, at the foot of the Central Highlands, for troops engaged on the high plateau, the point of origin for the road to Pleiku. Qui Nhon was probably the most important place in Binh Dinh province, which was undoubtedly why the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam chose to attack it. As a bellwether for the pacification situation in Vietnam, a Binh Dinh province attack offered to put a propaganda feather in the NLF’s cap.

Qui Nhon lay in the tactical area of responsibility of the South Korean expeditionary corps in Vietnam, but the bulk of defense forces  for Binh Dinh were troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 22nd Infantry Division, in particular its 41st Regiment. As the North Vietnamese and NLF did elsewhere in South Vietnam, they made careful preparations in Binh Dinh, including attempting to neutralize the ARVN. During the predawn hours of January 10, 1968, about three weeks before Tet, an estimated battalion of the Vietnam People’s Army attacked Phu My, base of Captain Nguyen Van Ru’s 2nd Battalion, 41st Infantry.

ARVN units were importantly backed by American advisers. Sergeant Ray J. Robison, one of four men with the battalion’s U.S. detachment, believes the word “adviser” is a misnomer. Captain Ru had been fighting since the French war. There was nothing the Americans could tell him. Rather, the advisers were the point men for ARVN access to many resources their army lacked–from lavish artillery and air support to a scale of supply the South Vietnamese lacked. The North Vietnamese knew that too. During the attack on Phu My some People’s Army bo dois were specifically assigned to take out the Americans’ bunker. The enemy soldiers crept up and rolled two grenades into the emplacement. The first burst wounded 1st Lieutenant Richard Morris, Staff Sergeant Robert Harcum, and Sergeant Gerald Deady, while concussion threw Sergeant Robison against the bunker wall. The second grenade landed at Robison’s feet, an object of morbid dread. But before anything else happened an ARVN private, Do Van Tan, jumped on top of the grenade and shielded the Americans from its blast. Private Tan became one of only three ARVN soldiers awarded the U.S. Distinguished Service Cross during the war.

Sergeant Robison lived to fight at Tet. The other Americans were sent to get medical treatment at Qui Nhon. Captain Ru’s battalion had been badly enough handled that Brigadier General Nguyen Van Hieu switched it for Major Duong’s 1st Battalion. Duong impressed Robison as another great guy to work with.

Then came Tet. It was the night of January 30/31. At least two Liberation Front units hit Qui Nhon–the E2B Local Force Battalion and the H-36 Sapper unit. A Vietnam People’s Army infantry battalion stood in reserve outside the city. The NLF targeted the compound of the South Vietnamese Military Security Service, the railroad yard, and the radio station. They struck an hour later than other positions in II Corps. Police chief Captain Bui Van Lan had time for some preparations, and he assembled five platoons and put them on alert. Captain Lan’s men turned aside most of the initial attacks, though the NLF captured the radio station (they were unable to broadcast any of their pre-recorded tapes). A South Korean battalion and two U.S.-led companies of montagnard strikers reacted to the NLF attacks.

Police killed the leader of the NLF sappers and captured their political officer among more than fifty others. Over 150 Liberation Front soldiers were killed. The Binh Dinh province chief called off the police units after dawn, turning instead to his Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) militia. To give the RF/PF, and the montagnards, more striking power, ARVN sent in Major Duong with two companies of his 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry. They airlifted from Phu My in CH-47 helicopters. The ARVNs complained, “We are jungle fighters, not city fighters,” but in Qui Nhon they would do splendidly.

Montagnards led by Green Beret Sergeant Michael R. Deeds were pushing toward the railroad yard as the ARVNs came up. The South Vietnamese infantry were painstakingly clearing nearby buildings house to house. A Green Beret and another soldier came up to Sergeant Robison, told him they had a 90mm recoilless rifle to set up, and asked him where on the rooftops they could best employ it. Robison advised them to stay off rooftops because enemy snipers were all around. The Americans disappeared but a little later one returned to ask for help–his sergeant had been wounded on the rooftop of a hotel. After seeing the situation for himself, Sergeant Robison told the young soldier to fetch his vehicle and put it as close to the wall of the building as he could. Robison then crept along the rooftop, got hold of the wounded Green Beret, and managed to lower him to the carrier truck that could take him to hospital. Sergeant Robison still wonders what became of the wounded American.

Major Duong’s soldiers spent two days working their way through Qui Nhon, while the South Korean troops cleared the hinterland outside the city. On the second day Sergeant Robison went along with the ARVN scouts ahead of a force of two platoons heading for an outlying village. They soon encountered the NLF and a firefight began that lasted all day. At one point Robison accompanied a relief party to retrieve several wounded Vietnamese soldiers, covering them with fire from his carbine. The sergeant would receive the Bronze Star with a combat “V” for his actions at Qui Nhon.

That second day ended with the security situation much improved. South Vietnamese authorities declared the battle at Qui Nhon over on February 5. Yet another of the NLF’s Tet tentacles had been lopped off.


Tagged , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

5 Responses to QUI NHON AT TET

  1. franklin smith says:

    I would like help to find pictures of gun jeeps of the 5th trans hq hq co. 1967-1968. We gave support of han jin trucks that took ammo to ammo dump at qui nhon. The ammo dump was hit at tet. got out of there. took gun fire back to qui nhon. 5 th trans. any pictures would like for myself. sp 5 franklin smith.

  2. Ken Kirby says:

    I was attached to the 93rd and led a squad of security that guarded the pier. We were responsible for the hourly throwing of the concussion grenades to protect against sabotage from VC divers. We also posted guards in towers around the perimeter as well as on the causeway leading from the pier. My squad consisted of 14 men. I was very proud of them.

    [EDITOR: You have every right to be proud. Thank you for adding to this story. Also, the 93rd what? Military Police?]

  3. Dean Turner says:

    I was aboard the SS Battle Creek Victory, an MSTS charter ship carrying ammo from CA to Vietnam and was anchored off of Qui Nhon when the Tet offensive broke out. There was another ship at anchor carrying 7,500 tons of naplam, which was blown up. We had a detachment of military onboard while at anchor who periodically dropped percussion grenades in the water in case there were swimmers looking to attach mines to the anchor chain. We could see the fighting on the beach from the deck of the ship. I will never forget those couple of days.

    [EDITOR: That’s quite a story.]

  4. Robert Mitchell says:

    Hello John, I was stationed in Vinh Long Vietnam in 1968. My comment is not related to the military activities during that time. However, i have a dear friend who was born in the Thanh Gia Hospital August 15, 1968. Her name is Christine and her mother’s name is Mai. Christine and her mother’s recitation of that time is vague and a lot of information is missing including her dad’s name. Mai can’t remember much as she had to destroy any documents and pictures before the vietcong found them. I apologize for dumping all this on you guys but i have exhausted all avenues to find her dad. He was an airman stationed near the hospital. Christine does not want to upset her dad’s life but she would love to at least speak to him if possible. Do you have any way or can suggest the best way to find his name from military records?

    [ATTENTION READERS– I am posting this in the hope that someone has information that may be of help to these folks.]

  5. Carl Hudson says:

    The MP’s knew it was going to happen the day before but I was a young E5 and would believe what I told them. I was visiting a friend who was downtown when his girlfriend told us that several VC were coming down the alley. I was on the way back from leave and had no weapon. We climbed on top of her house and hid behind a false front. They were 10 VC, armed to the teeth, including 2 RPGs and a squad size MG. they went down the alley and we reported it to the MPs downtown. A lieutenant and an E7 (sergeant first class said it was ARVNs but I knew better. They lost a lieutenant because of those two.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *