When Is a War “Winnable”?

September 1, 2015–This is a question everyone ought to be asking. In place after place today, most recently in Syria and against the fundamentalist group known as ISIS (the Islamic State or “caliphate”). American tactics centering on the use of air power and unarmed aircraft, or “drones,” have proven insufficient. Some observers are calling for boots on the ground. Already U.S. troops have returned to Iraq, which we left only a few years ago, to resume training an Iraqi army that failed miserably against ISIS. The CIA and Pentagon have both spun up operations to train and arm Syrian resistance fighters against ISIS, bands that have not gained much ground against the fundamentalists. Special operations forces have entered Syria too, on pinpoint raids against enemy leaders or hostage rescue missions (for a light primer on Special Forces see my new book here). The U.S. bombing campaign in Syria has just passed its first-year anniversary. So far the only apparent results are lengthening casualty lists and more destruction. The same kinds of activity characterize U.S. operations in the Yemen. The lack of results there runs in exact parallel.

Any pattern of military and paramilitary operations that assumes a routine shape can be said to have become a tactic or operational method. The pattern used in Syria and Yemen, developed to its present state of sophistication by the Obama administration, can be called “remote/proxy warfare.” Operational methods can be usefully reviewed and analyzed. The most direct avenues do so by asking, what does the tactic accomplish against the adversary, how practical is it in the context of friendly forces and capabilities, and what are foreseeable consequences of the interaction. It is also important to ask whether relevant information has been left out of the review.

Sometimes the most experienced and creative practitioners, taking full advantage of capabilities and their imaginations, fail to achieve the results anticipated. When that happens it is fair to ask if the conflict is winnable.

Here’s an example from the bad old days of the Vietnam war: Major General William E. DePuy led the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, renowned as the “Big Red One,” in the region north of Saigon over the period from March 1966 to February 1967. DePuy is a great example not just because he was an innovative military officer but because he actually did innovate the operational methods utilized by an allied coalition to win the First Gulf War of 1990-91.

General DePuy was also perfectly placed to produce results. Like others of his generation, the man was a product of World War II, and a small circle of officers from his unit, the 90th Infantry Division, became very notable moving between conventional and special warfare assignments. They were, perhaps, more open to unconventional thinking in their tactics. DePuy moved back and forth from the Army to the CIA (where he worked on covert operations against China), and from field units to operations staffs. It was one of his colleagues from the 90th Division cabal, Richard G. Stilwell, who not only brought DePuy into the CIA behind him, but also to Vietnam as the operations officer for General William G. Westmoreland’s top Vietnam command, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). There DePuy gained Westy’s full confidence, and he had two years to develop his understanding of the nature of the conflict.

Thus when General DePuy assumed command of the Big Red One he had everything going for him–a powerful and capable force, the full confidence of his commander-in-chief over the intervening level of command) and MACV headquarters, an imaginative and innovative nature, and a developed idea of the nature of the war. So what happened? DePuy performed exactly as his superiors must have hoped. He introduced new tactics–right down to giving his troops an improved way to dig their foxholes–kept up a high tempo of operations, emphasized helicopter assault techniques, and so on. The Army’s official historian ranks the Big Red One’s performance in a series of operations called “El Paso” up with the 1st Cavalry Division’s actions in the Central Highlands in late 1965 (the ones popularized in the book We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young). DePuy even changed field on the National Liberation Front (NLF) armed forces by staging a reverse ambush, where the 1st Division baited a trap by sending a road column into NLF-controlled territory after carefully preparing intervention forces to support it, artillery to match, and making sure to leak (only) the part about the road column to a known NLF spy. By several accounts General DePuy’s performance at the 1st Division shone.

Back in Washington the general was assigned to head a special office at the Pentagon that controlled military special operations and liaised between the armed services and the CIA. Then came the Tet Offensive of early 1968. Now, DePuy had been a very successful division commander. His successors had continued to attrite the enemy, which was General Westmoreland’s strategy. Yet at Tet the NLF and North Vietnamese were able to attack all across South Vietnam. President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) ordered his chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inspect the front and propose countermeasures. When they came back with Westmoreland’s request for a huge new troop contingent, Johnson asked a group of advisers he called the “wise men” to look at the claims. General DePuy would be tagged to present the military briefing to this group, which included generals and statesmen, past and present. DePuy briefed Tet as a U.S. military victory and relied upon his experience to describe the Vietnam war optimistically. Next the wise men turned around and told LBJ that Vietnam had become a disaster.

The president, stunned, demanded the briefers who had addressed the wise men repeat their presentations for him. DePuy later conceded that the briefers were perhaps a tad overwhelmed by the Washington point of view (pessimistic) on Vietnam, but the general stuck to his guns. The encounter proved chaotic–President Johnson was making phone calls even while the briefers droned on, and entertaining his grandson, a toddler at the time, giving him drinks from a bottle of Coca-Cola. But LBJ concluded there had been nothing wrong with what DePuy and the briefers had told the wise men.

What had happened was that William E. DePuy, the maker of victory, had been present at the moment when senior government officials decided the Vietnam war had become unwinnable.

The Big Red One, despite the ingenuity of DePuy and others like him, left Vietnam in 1970 having suffered 20,770 casualties, more than its toll in World War II, and nearly 85% of its losses in World War I, the division’s most costly conflict. Of its losses, 3,181 names are on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall in Washington, combat deaths in the field.

Now, back to remote/proxy warfare. That operational method did not work in Libya, its first major application, which seems at this writing to have disintegrated into a warlord state. In Pakistan, the province of the CIA, the proxies pocket the money and follow their own agenda, while the drones serve as a recruiting tool for the enemy. In the fight against ISIS the air campaign has had a modicum of value as a mechanism for tactical air support of proxy troops fighting ISIS, but very little value against the adversary as a movement. That is because the ISIS “state” is a very distributed network, while the air campaign has nowhere near the military weight that would be required to seriously impede ISIS logistics, exports, etc. –Plus, that weight of effort cannot, as a practical matter, be generated. If it were, as in Pakistan, it would be a recruiting tool for the enemy. A ground intervention is not sustainable in terms of public support or budgetary commitments. U.S. efforts to rally other nations to prevent individual persons from going to Syria to join ISIS will, in my view, involve such a level of social intervention as to also be unsustainable. The remaining question is when will we decide the war is unwinnable–and will there be a William DePuy character there to see it.

Whose Terror War? (2)

June 30, 2014–The caliphate has arrived, or at least we’ve been told it has. That is the confident assertion of propagandists for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), who over the weekend put out an announcement that the area they control is now one state, with their leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the caliph, or supreme leader. All Muslims the world over, we are told, now owe their allegiance to Al Baghdadi.

Listen up! ISIS is confirming what was argued here several weeks ago (“Whose Terror War?” June 3, 2014)– that the terror war has changed. The object of the jihadis is not an “imminent” attack on the United States, as popularizers of the war on terror would have us believe, but primacy among Islamists.

The original Al Qaeda has already “expelled” ISIS from the movement, or jihad, or however you want to describe the politico-religious framework in which this array of movements functions. You can be sure as well that other groups–including the Shahaab in Somalia and Kenya, the Magreb front in Chad, the islamists in Central African Republic and Mali, the Army of God in Sub-Saharan Africa, will all be surprised–and doubtless annoyed–that they are now supposed to report to Al Bagdadi.

This development lends further weight to the proposition that what we are seeing is a collection of local revolutionary movements intent on imposing social change for religious purposes. The islamists may believe that the West and the United States are decadent, but this is not a unified international front that aims at striking the U.S. There is no “global war on terror.” If that ever existed it ended a long time ago.

No Rant on Iraq

June 13, 2014–Don’t succumb to the siren songs of temptresses on the latest Iraq debacle. This is a right wing screed propelled by a feel-good drive to think that something we did there was worthwhile. My time today is very limited but I want to say– remember how we got here.

First off, the United States did not “win” the Iraq war. There is nothing there which we achieved and we have no winnings to protect. Democracy in Iraq? The Maliki government is no more a democracy than that of Saddam Hussein. Maliki has spent his time in power seizing control of more levers of power and excluding ethnic and religious groups other than his own Shiites. Vice-presidents and senior officials of his own government have fled to evade trumped up criminal charges. Is it any wonder Sunnis and Kurds won’t fight for the Baghdad government?

Second, Maliki swore off U.S. aid. His refusal to enter into the status of forces agreement that Washington sought as we withdrew our main forces from Iraq was understandable from a nationalist point of view. But both the U.S. and Iraq understood that refusal meant the end of U.S. training for the Iraqi military. Maliki then undermined the Iraqi military by employing the same tactics he did with the political system as a whole. Maliki buttered his own bread. Intervention now does not prevent Iraqi WMD, any more than it did in 2003, and it does not preserve Iraqi democracy.

Next, Washington’s basic decision was made when President Obama rejected calls to intervene in Syria. The fighters threatening Iraq today have spilled across the border from Syria and represent an attempt to forge a confessional state that will take over that area. For that to happen the so-called ISIS group has to topple not just Mr. Maliki but the Hafez Asad regime as well. Intervention against ISIS in Iraq is actually the equivalent of helping Asad. Americans shouldn’t want to do that.

Military action in Iraq is the wrong intervention at the wrong time and for the wrong reasons.